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I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing importance of technology over the last 200
years, society has devised two legal means-patent law and trade
secret law-of regulating the protection of industrial ideas, items
of production and methods. Both of these systems have the basic,
dual policy goals of promoting the free exchange of ideas in order
to stimulate competition, while at the same time granting pro-
tection to the inventor so that he will be allowed to benefit from
his invention and thus be provided with an incentive to continue
to invent.
Patent law provides statutory protection for a limited amount
of time, after which the idea, item of production, or method be-
comes part of the public domain. Trade secret law places more
emphasis upon the goal of protecting the industrial information, but
this protection is granted only as long as the information actually
is secret. Once the secrecy is broken through some legitimate
means (e.g., a competitor buys the product on the open market
and then "reverse-engineers" the product so as to discover its
secrets), then trade secret protection also is removed and the infor-
mation becomes part of the public domain.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit re-
cently focused on the relationship between these two systems in
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.' In this case, a number of em-
ployees left Kewanee with trade secrets in their possession. These
secrets were utilized to establish a competitor, Bicron Corpora-
tion. Kewanee sued Bicron for the misappropriation of the trade
secrets. The court held that federal patent law preempted state
1. 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S.
Oct. 9, 1973 (No. 73-187)).
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trade secret law with the result that the employees were held not
liable for their misappropriation.
Thus, we feel compelled to conclude that a state trade secret
law which protects an inventor in the maintenance of a monopoly
of a device which is an appropriate subject for patent under the
United States Patent Laws is in conflict with the policies and
purposes of those patent laws where the invention has been used
commercially for more than one year.2
In its reasoning to this result, the Kewanee court heavily de-
pended on Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stifel Co.3 and Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,4 which held that federal patent law
preempted state unfar competition law which prohibited the
copying of an object although that object had been denied any
protection under the federal patent laws. As trade secret law is
part of the general area of unfair competition, the Kewanee court
believed that the broad language of Sears and Compco was appli-
cable to trade secret cases as well. In so holding, the sixth cir-
cuit case came into direct conflict with the holdings of a number of
other courts of appeals. 5 These courts essentially held that no con-
flict existed because the confidential nature of a trade secret de-
served some sort of special protection. Sears and Compco were dis-
tinguished generally on the grounds that they dealt with the copy-
ing of an object rather than the breach of a confidential relation-
ship.
This comment will discuss the applicability of federal patent
law as it relates to the possible preemption of state trade secret
law. In order to more fully understand this preemption, this com-
ment will consider the means by which the trade secret was
obtained and the subject matter of the trade secret. The most
common means by which a trade secret is violated is through the
breach of a confidential relationship, as when an employee dis-
2. Id. at 1086. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970) provides that no patent will
be granted if the invention "was patented ... or in public use or
on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for the patent in the United States." "Public use" has
been interpreted to include commercial exploitation of a trade secret.
See note 25 and accompanying text infra.
3. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
4. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
5. Servo Corp. of America v. General Elec. Corp., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934 (1966); Dekar Indus., Inc. v. Bisset-
Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
945 (1971); Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mg. Co.,
350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965); Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems., Inc.,
410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969); Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc. 442 F.2d
216 (2d Cir. 1971).
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closes to a competitor secret information which he obtained in the
course of his employment, or a manufacturer uses information dis-
closed to it by an inventor during the process or negotiation and
then refuses to pay any royalties to the original inventor. How-
ever, an explicit confidential relationship is not essential for pro-
tection of a trade secret; trade secret protection also can be
obtained against industrial espionage since fair competitors implic-
ity agree not to engage in such tactics.( It should be noted at
the outset that some means by which a trade secret may be ob-
tained are considered legitimate and the user of the trade secret
will not be held liable; reverse-engineering is an example of a
legitimate method of obtaining trade secrets. The problems con-
cerned with the means by which the information was obtained
will be discussed in greater detail shortly.7
The relevance of the subject matter of the trade secret to the
relationship between trade secret law and patent law is more dif-
ficult. Basically, the question is whether trade secret protection,
with its flexible common law requirements and potentially unlim-
ited monopoly, is the most appropriate protection, or whether the
underlying information or method is such that it would be more
appropriate to apply patent law, with its more precise statutory
requirements and limited 17-year monopoly. To answer this ques-
tion, the possible subject matter may be classified according to:
(1) whether the underlying information or method is capa-
able of being patented at all;8 (2) if the information or method is
patentable, whether a patent was obtained; and (3) if a patent was
obtained, whether it was held to be valid when it was later liti-
gated. This comment will argue that if the underlying informa-
tion or method was appropriate subject material for a patent, or
if a patent was obtained on the method or information, or if a pat-
ent was obtained but that patent was later held to be invalid, then
trade secret protection should be inapplicable. To hold otherwise
would undermine the specific requirements and monopolies of the
patent system.
As will be seen in the discussion of the cases, the application
of this principle is not always easy or precise because the subject
matter of the information often is not discovered easily. For ex-
6. E.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).
7. See Section H infra.
8. "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the con-
ditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
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ample, if the inventor decides to submit his invention to be pat-
ented, the determination of whether the information or process is
patentable involves a long series of examinations and hearings
by the Patent Office, with perhaps even a second series of exami-
nations and hearings by the judicial system if the patent is later
litigated. The utility of the principle becomes more evident in
cases where it is reasonably clear that the underlying information
either falls within the realm of patent law, or falls outside of pat-
ent law altogether. An example of the former instance occurred
where the trade secret was patented and, although the patent was
declared invalid, the court nevertheless proceeded to apply trade
secret law. The court thereby granted protection to information
which it had just determined did not meet the more rigorous re-
quirements of patent law.9 On the other hand, an example of the
latter instance-where the subject matter is outside of patent law
-might be a secret list of business customers. If this list is to re-
ceive any protection at all, it must receive it from trade secrpi
law.10
The appellate courts before Kewanee focused almost entirely on
the means by which the information was obtained. Once it was
determined that a confidential relationship had been breached,
the courts refused to examine the underlying subject material of
the information, object or method to determine whether it should
be protected under patent law, if any protection was to be afforded
at all. In contrast, Kewanee examined only the subject material
of the object. Once it had determined that the information, ob-
ject or method was appropriate subject material for a patent, it
refused to consider the means by which the information was ob-
tained; the breach of the confidential relationship was no longer
determinative.
Thus, Kewanee raises the question whether federal patent law
preempts state trade secret law with respect to objects or infor-
mation subject to a patent. In resolving this question, it is help-
ful to consider a subsidiary question: on what factor or factors
should the court focus in reaching a decision as to preemption?
Should the court consider only the means by which the informa-
tion was obtained; should it consider only the subject material of
the information or should the court consider both factors?
The premise of this article is that it is improper to focus exclu-
sively on the subject material of the trade secret, as Kewanee did,
or to focus exclusively on the means by which the trade secret was
9. See note 69 and accompanying text infra.
10. See note 95 and accompanying text infra.
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obtained, as the other circuits largely have. Instead, it will be
suggested that both the subject material of the trade secret and the
means by which it was obtained should be examined in relation
to the possible impact on the free passage of ideas and methods,
on the one hand, and the impact on the protection of an inven-
tor's own ideas and methods, on the other hand.
Section II will describe briefly the two systems of protection.
Section III will discuss the trend toward federal patent law pre-
emption of state unfair competition law. The holdings of courts
of appeals conflicting with Kewanee will be examined in Section
IV. Kewanee pushed preemption one step further, holding that
federal patent law preempted the related area of state trade se-
cret law with respect to patentable items; this development will
be examined in Section V. Finally, Section VI will conclude with
possible implication of an expected Supreme Court decision in this
area.
II. COMPETING SYSTEMS
A description of the essential differences between federal pat-
ent law and state trade secret law is helpful at this point. Con-
gress obtained the power from the Constitution to grant patents
in order "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
sive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."" Con-
gress has delegated this power to the Patent Office. 1 2 The basic
statutory requirements for a patent are found in Title 35 of the
United States Code, section 101: "Whoever invents or discovers
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may ob-
tain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title."'1  A patent's subject matter cannot "have been ob-
vious at the time the invention was made to a person having or-
dinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains."'14 In
order to receive a patent, application must be filed with the Patent
Office by the inventor or his representatives.' 5
The most significant statutory requirement for the purposes of
this comment is that no patent will be granted if "the invention
was patented ... or in public use or on sale in this country, more
than one year prior to the date of the application for the patent in
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
12. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1, 14 (1970).
13. Id. § 101.
14. Id. § 103.
15. Id. §§ 111, 116, 117, 118.
FEDERAL PATENT PREEMPTION
the United States."0 "Public use" has been interpreted to include
secret use for profit.17 Accordingly, continued use of a trade secret
for a profit threatens the patentability of the article. Thus, the
inventor is forced to elect, at an early date, whether he should seek
trade secret or patent protection. If he applies for a patent, his
application is kept secret,' 8 so in the event his application is not
accepted, it is possible that he will later be able to resurrect trade
secret law.19 It seems reasonable that once a patent is issued, trade
secret protection ends.20 Trade secret protection potentially might
be of an indefinite length of time, but it also might be a very short-
lived protection if the secret is disclosed by legitimate means.
Once a patent is granted by the Patent Office, the inventor or
his representative has the right to obtain relief against anyone
who infringes on his patent.21 During the course of this infringe-
ment suit, his patent may be declared invalid by the court.22  In
that case, patent protection ceases.
Trade secret protection is granted by the state rather than
federal government. On author has suggested five basic confiden-
tial relationships in which trade secret protection is relevant.2 3
First, an employer may disclose secret information, in the course
of employment, to an employee who then leaves the employer and
either joins a competitor or sets up his own competing business.
16. Id. § 102(b).
17. Metallizing Eng'r Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d
516 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1970).
19. There is a split of authority on this question. Brown v. Fowler, 316
S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), holds that trade secret is retained;
American Gauge & Mfg. Co. v. Maasdam, 245 F.2d 62 (6th Cir. 1957),
holds that trade secret protection is not retained.
20. See notes 79-84 and accompanying text infra.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1970).
22. 35 U.S.C. § 282(2) (1970) states that a patent may be declared in-
valid for failure to comply with 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-188 (1970). Besides
failure to follow proper procedure, these code provisions establish the
requirements that the invention be a "process, machine or composition
of matter," id. § 101; original with the inventor, id. §§ 101, 115; useful,
id. § 101; and not obvious "to a person having ordinary skill in the
art to which said subject matter pertains," id. § 103. The invention
also cannot be otherwise known, used, or patented by others, id. § 102
(a), (b); described in another patent application, id. § 102(e); or
placed in public sale or use more than a year prior to the date of
the patent application, id. § 102 (b).
35 U.S.C. § 282(3) (1970) states that a patent may also be de-
clared invalid for failure to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970) which
requires a clear and precise description of the patent or 35 U.S.C.
§ 251 (1970) which discusses the reissue of invalid patents.
,23. Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent
and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 IfHAv. L. REV. 1432, 1435-39 (1967).
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Second, the inventor may disclose confidential information to a
manufacturer for development; the manufacturer then applies the
information for its own use without further development and re-
fuses to pay any royalties to the original inventor. Third, a man-
ufacturer may reveal the information to a prospective supplier or
customer for the latter's consideration, who in turn discloses the
information to a competitor. Fourth, the information may be dis-
closed outside of a business context; for example, the Patent Of-
fice might accidentally disclose the information. Finally, the com-
petitor might resort to industrial espionage to gain information
directly.
If the information is obtained outside of a confidential rela-
tionship, there is no liability. There must be either an explicit or
an implicit understanding that the information will not be re-
vealed to a competitor. Thus, one may legally reverse-engineer
another's product by examining it as completed to discover the
various secret ideas inherent in it. 2 4
The information must actually be a secret.25  It cannot be
generally known throughout the industry. If the information is
not secret, there can be no liability although a confidential rela-
tionship was broken.
There is considerable division of opinion concerning whether
the idea must somehow be novel or otherwise be a discovery, or
whether any idea can be a trade secret, regardless of its novelty.26
24. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 375 (7th Cir. 1953).
25. There need not be absolute secrecy to maintain an action for the dis-
closure of a trade secret. Dravo held that trade secret protection
was retained although a general description and minor details of the
secret had been disclosed in publicity material. One formulation of
the degree of secrecy is that a trade secret is "a plan or process,
tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owners and those
of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it." Cameron
Mach. Co. v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 115 A. 212, 214 (N.J. Chain.
1921). Another definition of the degree of secrecy is that "a trade
secret requires some process or method which is not obvious or gen-
erally known in the trade, and which gives the innovator a substan-
tial advantage over a competitor." Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Form-
ulation, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202, 208 (D. Wis. 1969). For further dis-
cussion, see 2 R. CALLmAN, THE LAw or UNFAIR CoMPETrTION TRADE-
MARKS AND MoNoPoLIEs § 53.3 (e) (3d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as
CALLMAN].
26. For example, one court has stated, "We assume that almost any
knowledge or information used in the conduct of one's business may
be held by its possessor in secret." Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d
369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953). Other courts have required some sort of
discovery. See Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F.
Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
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However, it is clear that even those courts which do demand some
degree of novelty, or discovery, do not require the level of
uniqueness required for a patent.27 To a certain extent this is nec-
essary because some items which trade secret law protects are
clearly unpatentable (e.g., a list of customers), but it also allows
inventors to decide whether they will risk trade secret law or, in-
stead, attempt to receive a patent. If the inventor believes that
his invention is of doubtful patentability or if he desires longer
protection, he might elect to continue to keep the information se-
cret.
The protection afforded by trade secret law is limited in com-
parison to patent protection. Trade secret law protects the inven-
tor only against breaches of a confidential relationship and only
against those persons who either infringe or directly receive the
benefits of the breach. The inventor cannot bring suit against
those who later receive the information through regular trade
practices, or against those who successfully reverse-engineer his
product. Patent law, on the other hand, protects the inventor
against infringement, no matter what the source of that infringe-
ment may be. Thus, for example, the inventor can protect him-
self against reverse-engineering under patent law.
Trade secret law potentially affords an indefinite period of pro-
tection, which is one major reason why an investor may elect to
use trade secret protection rather than patent protection where,
by statute, the shield disappears after 17 years.28
The difficulty is that the period of protection for a trade se-
cret also is potentially very short, so some sort of rigid internal
security is needed, and this can be expensive. If the holder of a
trade secret is successful, however, he can withhold the informa-
tion from his competitors for an indefinite period of time and so
hinder the passage of ideas in free and open competition.
The basis of protection and the possible remedies of patent
law and trade secret law are different. If an inventor elects to
keep his invention secret, he foregoes all possible patent protec-
tion. Patent protection is broader (e.g., it protects against reverse-
27. Quite clearly discovery is something less than invention. In-
vention requires genius, imagination, inspiration, or whatever
is the faculty that gives birth to the inventive concept. Dis-
covery may be the result of industry, application, or be perhaps
merely fortuitous. The discoverer, however, is entitled to the
same protection as the inventor.
A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 538 (6th
Cir. 1934).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
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engineering), but it also is for only a limited time period. Trade
secrets can be protected potentially for an indefinite period, but
trade secret protection also can be lost as soon as it is no longer a
secret. Trade secret law provides remedies only against those
who violate the confidential relationship (or who are direct
parties in the violation), whereas patent protection provides rem-
edies against any who make, use, or sell the patented invention,
and thereby infringe on the patent.2
Ill. EXPANDING FEDERAL PREEMPTION
In order to understand the reasoning of Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., with its advocacy of preemption, and the conflicting
cases decided in other circuits, it is first necessary to examine the
trend toward federal patent law preemption of state unfair compe-
tition laws. First formally expounded by the United States Su-
preme Court in the two cases of Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co.30 and Compco v. Day-Brite Lighting,31 the doctrine was further
articulated in Brulotte v. Thys Co.,3 2 and perhaps reached its
height in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,3 3 especially in Justice Black's partial
dissent in Lear. The future of federal preemption today is unclear,
however, after Goldstein v. California.3 4
It should be emphasized that none of the above cases deal
with trade secrets. However, both Kewanee and the opposing
cases frequently relied upon these Supreme Court unfair competi-
tion cases to support their reasoning in regard to trade secrets.
Of prime importance to the issue of federal patent law pre-
emption are the leading cases of Sears and Compco. The factual
patterns of these two cases are virtually identical. In Sears, Stiffel
Company had secured design and mechanical patents on a pole
lamp. Sears proceeded to copy the lamps at a much cheaper price.
Stiffel sued under the theories of patent infringement and the Il-
linois statute forbidding unfair competition by copying articles.
The district court declared Stiffel's patents invalid, thereby dis-
missing the patent infringement suit, but the court held Sears
guilty of unfair competition under Illinois law. Sears was en-
joined from unfairly competing, and an accounting to determine
lost profits and damages was ordered. Similarly, in Compco, the
district court held Day-Brite's patents to be invalid but, neverthe-
29. Id. § 271(a).
30. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
31. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
32. 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
33. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
34. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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less, found Compco to be liable for unfair competition in the
copying of fluorescent lighting fixtures and affixed damages.
The court of appeals affirmed.35
In opinions written by Justice Black, the Supreme Court,
with sweeping language, reversed the lower courts in both cases.
"Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws
directly, it cannot under some other law, such as that forbidding
unfair competition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the
objectives of the federal patent law."36 Federal patent law pre-
empted the conflicting state law. The Court went on to reason
that an unpatented article was not entitled to patent protection.
Thus, another party had every right to copy that article. "But be-
cause of the Federal patent laws, a State may not, when the arti-
cle is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the
article itself or award damages for such copying."3 7 In short, if
the article was not patented, it was in the public domain.
In the accompanying Compco decision, handed down the same
day, Justice Black qualified Sears slightly while reversing the
court of appeals.38 "A State of course has power to impose liabil-
ity upon those who, knowing that the public is relying upon an
original manufacturer's reputation for quality and integrity, de-
ceive the public by palming off their copies as the original."3 9
While the state may consider such questions as consumer confu-
sion, "[r] egardless of the copier's motives, neither these facts nor
any others can furnish a basis for imposing liability for or prohib-
iting the actual acts of copying and selling. '40
The Supreme Court in Sears and Compco thereby limited the
state's power to enjoin unfair competition on unpatented articles
to matters concerning misleading labels and palming off copies as
the original. The Court did not depend upon any specific patent
statutes, but relied upon the patent clause of the Cbnstitution4'
combined with the supremacy clause.42 It is this broad reading of
the Constitution which gives Sears and Compco much of their
sweeping effect. The Court implied that its decisions were not to
be limited to interpretation of a single statute, but rather that the
very foundation of the various patent statutes and regulations
35. 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963).
36. 376 U.S. at 231.
37. Id. at 232-33.
38. 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
39. 376 U.S. at 238.
40. Id.
41. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
42. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
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are in question here. In its essence, the Court implied that the
intent of the patent clause was to encourage competition by grant-
ing limited rights for a limited time to the inventor, as well as
providing a means by which the inventor may receive the bene-
fits of his invention. Thus, the states should not be allowed to in-
terfere with this competition by granting rights which extend be-
yond those contained in the federal patent laws. As Justice Black
declared, "To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competi-
tion to prevent the copying of an article which represents too
slight an advance to be patented would be to permit the State to
block off from the public something which Federal Law has said
belongs to the public.143  The Court was willing to focus on the
subject matter of the information disclosed and stated that it was
appropriate subject matter for a patent, but that no valid patent
had been upheld. The Court did not entirely focus on the means
by which the information was obtained.
The Supreme Court next considered the problem of federal
patent law preemption in Brulotte. In this case the licensor of a
hop-picking machine contracted to prevent the assignment or re-
moval of the machines from a limited geographical area both be-
fore and after the expiration of the patents. Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Douglas contended that "[t] he licensor was using li-
censes to project its [statutory patent] monopoly beyond the pat-
ent period. ' 44 While state contract law might allow such an ex-
tention of the licensor's power on the theory that a reasonable
amount of time to spread payments for the use of the patent could
be greater than a 17-year period,45 the Court concluded that "a
patentee's use of a royalty agreement that projects beyond the
expiration date of the patent is unlawful, per se. If that device
were available to patentees, the free market visualized for the
post-expiration period would be subject to monopoly influences
that have no place there."46
As with Justice Black in Sears and Compco, Justice Douglas
did not rely on any particular patent statute or regulation. Rather,
he implied that the mere existence of a patent system meant that
the owner of a patent should only receive the benefits explicitly
set out in the patent statutes and should not be allowed to ex-
tend his monopoly power by means of state contract law so as to
43. 376 U.S. at 231-32.
44. 379 U.S. at 32.
45. This was a principal theory of the Washington Supreme Court which
upheld the contract. Thys Co. v. Brulotte, 62 Wash. 2d 284, 291, 382
P.2d 271, 275 (1963).
46. 379 U.S. at 32-33.
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limit competition. In short, Justice Douglas argued that federal
patent law preempted a portion of state contract law in regard to
an expired patent.
In Lear, the Court considered the problem of licensee estoppel.
The essential question was whether Lear, the licensee, was es-
topped from denying the validity of the licensor Adkins' patent in
a suit for royalties. The California Supreme Court, allowing the
estoppel, stated:
[O]ne of the oldest doctrines in the field of patent law establishes
that so long as a licensee is operating under a license agreement
he is estopped to deny the validity of his licensor's patent in a
suit for royalties under the agreement. The theory underlying
this doctrine is that a licensee should not be permitted to enjoy
the benefit afforded by the agreement while simultaneously urg-
ing that the patent which forms the basis of the agreement is
void.47
In reversing the California Supreme Court, Justice Harlan once
again argued that preemption by the patent clause of the Constitu-
tion precluded state interference in the area of regulating free
competition so far as patented articles are concerned.
Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily when
they are balanced against the important public interest in per-
mitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in
reality a part of the public domain. Licensees may often be the
only individuals with enough economic incentive to challenge the
patentability of an inventor's discovery. If they are muzzled, the
public may continually be required to pay tribute to would-be
monopolists without need or justification. 48
The Court also stated that "enforcing this contractual provision
would undermine the strong Federal policy favoring the full and
free use of ideas in the public domain,"49 thereby stressing the
importance of the patent system which grants only a limited
monopoly.
Interestingly, the Court raised the issue of trade secrets: "To
what extent [may] the States .. .protect the owners of unpat-
ented inventions who are willing to disclose their ideas to manu-
facturers only upon payment of royalties[?] "50 However, the
Court refused to resolve this issue. "We should not now attempt
to define in even a limited way the extent, if any, to which the
States may properly act to enforce the contractual rights of in-
47. Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 882, 891, 435 P.2d 321, 325-26, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 545, 549-50 (1967).
48. 395 U.S. at 670.
49. Id. at 674.
50. Id. (emphasis original).
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ventors of unpatented secret ideas."51 The Supreme Court then
remanded the case to the California courts to "reconcile the com-
peting demands of patent and contract law.
'52
One of the more extreme statements of the federal preemption
concept is Justice Black's partial dissent in Lear, with which
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas concurred. Justice
Black concurred with the majority opinion except as to the ma-
jority's reservation "for future decision the question whether the
States have power to enforce contracts under which someone
claiming to have a new discovery can obtain payment for disclos-
ing it while his patent application is pending, even though the dis-
covery is later held to be unpatentable."' 53
Justice Black went on to explain the reasoning behind his
dissent:
I still entertain the belief I expressed for the Court in Stiffel
and Compco that no State has a right to authorize any kind of
monopoly on what is claimed to be a new invention, except when
a patent has been obtained from the Patent Office under the exact-
ing standards of the patent laws. One who makes a discovery may,
of course, keep it secret if he wishes, but private arrangements un-
der which self-styled "inventors" do not keep their discoveries se-
cret, but rather disclose them, in return for contractual payments,
run counter to the plan of our patent laws, which tightly regulate
the kind of inventions that may be protected and the manner in
which they may be protected. The national policy expressed in the
patent laws, favoring free competition and narrowly limiting
monopoly, cannot be frustrated by private agreements among indi-
viduals, with or without the approval of the State.54
Justice Black, the author of Sears and Compco, seemed willing
in this dissent to sacrifice largely the interests of inventors who
are not directly connected with some large corporate enterprise.
There are considerable implications to the views expressed in his
dissent. Given the massive problems of production, it simply is
not realistic to require that inventors develop and manufacture
their own inventions. The process' o4 obtaining a patent is a
lengthy and expensive one which few of the so-called "self-styled
inventors" can afford to complete before they dare disclose their
inventions to others and so receive some financial benefits.
While not as expansive as Justice Black's partial dissent in
Lear, the cumulative effect of Sears, Compco, Brulotte and Lear
seriously erodes the property rights of both patented and unpat-
51. Id. at 675.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 676.
54. Id. at 677.
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ented articles. The preemptive effect of the patent and suprem-
acy clauses of the Constitution dictates that the property owner
should receive only those rights which are explicitly stated in the
various patent regulations, and no more. Although state law is
still binding as to subsidiary matters such as labeling and con-
tracts between licensors of valid patents and their licensees dur-
ing the lifetime of the patents, the Supreme Court has clearly
stated that it will not tolerate any substantial interference with
the monopoly aspect of patents, which is the key factor of the
patent system. The patent monopoly may not be expanded via
limitations on copying of unpatented items, projection of contract
terms beyond 17 years, or estoppel of licensees from litigating the
validity of their licensors' patents.
The Court did not address itself to trade secret law in these
cases, except for a passing statement in Lear that the Court
would not determine the state's power to protect the owners of
unpatented inventions. Thus, the application of the emerging
principle of federal preemption to matters related to trade secret
law has been left for the lower federal and state courts for the
time being.
In June of 1973, after all the other cases discussed were de-
cided, including Kewanee, the United States Supreme Court, in a
5-4 decision, held in Goldstein that the State of California could
prohibit tape piracy. The defendants had duplicated several re-
cordings of major musical artists without the permission of the
owner of the master record. This directly violated a California
statute.5 5 The defendants moved to dismiss the state court com-
plaint on the grounds that the California statute was in conflict
with the copyright clause of the Constitution5 6 and, more particular-
ly, that the entire area of sound recordings was preempted by Public
Law 92-140. 57 The latter states that federal copyright protection ap-
plies to sound recordings made after February 15, 1972. The fed-
eral law specifically provides no retroactive effect as to any re-
cordings made before that date. Therefore, the defendant argued,
California could not enforce a copyright after February 15, 1972,
because federal law preempted the entire area. The California
Supreme Court did not accept this argument and upheld the valid-
ity of the California statute forbidding the copying of recordings.
Writing for the majority in affirming the California decision,
Chief Justice Burger relied heavily on the notion that the copy-
55. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h (West 1970).
56. US. CONST. art. L § 8.
57. Pub. L. No. 92-140 (Oct. 15, 1971).
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right clause did not necessarily preempt state law. "We must also
be careful to distinguish those situations in which the concurrent
exercise of a power by the Federal Court and the States or by the
States alone may possibly lead to conflicts and those situations
where conflicts will necessarily arise."58
He went on to argue that although "the objective of the Copy-
right clause was clearly to facilitate the granting of rights national
in scope", 59 in this particular case "[w]e cannot discern such an
unyielding national interest as to require an inference that state
power to grant copyrights has been relinquished to exclusive fed-
eral control."6' 0
Certain aspects of the Court's reasoning in reaching this con-
clusion seem questionable. It realized that allowing a state to grant
copyright to a recording has considerably greater effect than the
a State which grants copyright protection may, however, be ad-
versely affected by other States that do not .... "61 However,
the Court argued that this conflict would not be especially severe.
Furthermore, it stated, "The situation is no different from that
which may arise in regard to other state monopolies, such as food
concession in a limited enclosure, such as a state park, or a state
lottery; in each case, citizens may escape the effect of one state's
monopoly by making purchases in another area or another state
state., 6
2
This analogy seems questionable since a state's granting of a
copyright to a recording has considerably greater effect than the
food concession in a state park. A food concession involves a very
small area of land and concerns only those individuals who actu-
ally choose to buy food within the park. A record copyrighted
by the state, on the other hand, has a much greater impact since it
involves the entire state and everyone who desires to buy records
within the state. Furthermore, it affects individuals in other
states as well. It would seem that in forbidding the unauthorized
transfer of a recording within the State of California, California
would also be severely limiting the availability of "bootleg" al-
bums in other states as well. Due to the concentration of record-
ing facilities in a few states, those states could grant copyrights
and so interfere with citizens of other states who desired to buy
unauthorized recordings. Problems could also arise if California
58. 412 U.S. at 554 (emphasis original).
59. Id. at 555.
60. Id. at 558 (emphasis original).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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desired to forbid the actual sale of the records as well. Here,
California would be interfering with the livelihood of individuals
in other states who may desire to sell their unauthorized records
to the population centered in California.
The defendants had also argued that California, through its
statute, was creating a copyright of unlimited duration, in conflict
with a 28-year limit of federal copyright statutes with a possible
renewal of another 28 years.63 The Supreme Court rejected this
contention by stating that "[t]he exclusive right granted by a
State is confined to its borders. Consequently, even when the
right is unlimited in duration, any tendency to inhibit further
progress in science or the arts is narrowly transcribed."6 4  The
Court did not consider the possible problems of numerous states
granting such unlimited protection. For example, if all states
granted the copyright protection which California does, then a
nationwide system of state copyrights would exist which would
undermine the existing federal system of copyright law. A dual
system would in fact exist, which could result in confusion and
conflicting laws.
Finally, after briefly summarizing the history of litigation
concerning sound recordings, the Court distinguished Sears and
Compco.
Sears and Compco, on which petitioners rely, do not support their
position. In those cases, the question was whether a State could,
under principles of a state unfair competition law, preclude the
copying of mechanical configurations which did not possess the
qualities for the granting of a federal design or mechanical pat-
ent.6 5
After quoting from Sears, the Court continued:
In regard to mechanical configurations, Congress had balanced the
need to encourage innovation and originality of invention against
the need to insure competition in the sale of identical or substan-
tially identical products. The standards established for granting
federal patent protection to machines thus indicated not only
which articles in this particular category Congress wished to pro-
tect, but which configurations it wished to remain free.... No
comparable conflict between state law and federal law arises in
the case of recordings of musical performances.66
Taken by itself, this passage implies that Congress has in fact
preempted state law with respect to anything which is potentially
patentable and if an object or process is not suitable for patent
63. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
64. 412 U.S. at 560-61.
65. Id. at 569.
66. Id. at 569-70.
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protection, then no other protection should be granted by the state.
Accordingly, since trade secret law provides at least indirect pro-
tection of the "mechanical configuration," state trade secret law
should be preempted by federal patent law.
There are several reasons why this interpretation of Goldstein
should not be stressed unduly. First, the passage relating to
patent law is dictum as the Court's actual holding was concerned
only with a California statute which prohibited tape piracy. Sec-
ond, and more importantly, the Court failed to explain why Con-
gress has preempted the field as to "mechanical configurations,"
while at the same time it has allowed the states to regulate "sound
recordings" so long as they do not necessarily conflict with the
Federal copyright statutes and regulations. There is nothing ob-
vious in the systems of patent law and copyright law which would
decree such a widely divergent result.
Three unanswered questions are raised by Goldstein. First,
whether Sears and Compco are limited to the copying of mechani-
cal configurations. Secondly, whether Goldstein heralds a new
era in which the states might be allowed to regulate those areas
of copyright and related areas of patent law which do not directly
infringe upon federal laws. And, finally, whether the preemp-
tion trend, best seen in Lear, will continue with the Court empha-
sizing free competition and not allowing any extension of the pat-
ent-type monopoly by the state, with the result that Goldstein
will be limited to the regulation of musical recordings.
The answer to these questions, unfortunately, is far from cer-
tain. One avenue for determining the answer is to examine the
strong dissents in Goldstein by Justices Douglas and Marshall
(with Justices Brennan and Blackman concurring). Both dissents
argued that the language of Sears and Compco dictates that the
states should not be allowed to extend a monopoly either where
the federal patent and copyright laws clearly do not permit a mon-
opoly, or where they are silent. As Justice Marshall stated,
"Congress has decided that free competition should be the gen-
eral rule, until it is convinced that the failure to provide copy-
right or patent protection is hindering 'the Progress of Science
and useful Arts.' "67 What is especially noteworthy is that both
dissents realized that tape pirating was not an attractive affair,
but nevertheless that "[w] e should not let our distaste of 'pi-
rates' interfere with our interpretation of the copyright laws."6 8
67. Id. at 579.
68. Id.
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This agreement could indicate that the issue of general equity
was raised (e.g., whether one who does not pay any royalties to the
artist or writer should be allowed to duplicate the records, make
a profit and undersell those who created, or at least were au-
thorized to use, the recording in the first place). But, the ma-
jority did not mention this issue, concentrating instead on federal
preemption. Thus, one possible extrapolation from the dis-
sents' mention of equity might be that the majority found the
business of tape pirating so distasteful that it was willing to al-
low the California legislature to use its general police powers to
suppress tape pirating in the absence of any federal legislation ap-
plicable to the period before February 15, 1972.
In any event, it is clear the the Goldstein opinion does empha-
size that there are limits to the extent that federal copyright and
possibly patent law will be allowed to preempt state unfair compe-
tion law in the absence of any specific federal legislation. Ex-
actly where the bounds of preemption are located is not known. It
can be argued that Goldstein stands for not applying preemption
to preclude state activity only where the Court feels that some
genuine inequity exists which state unfair competition law might
remedy and where Congress has not acted.
Certainly before Goldstein, a strong trend toward federal pre-
emption existed, and it was this trend that the Kewanee decision
took one step further and applied to state trade secret law. With
Goldstein, the Supreme Court stated that limits to federal pre-
emption exist, although the actual location of these limits is not
clear at this time.
IV. TRADE SECRET LAW BEFORE KEWANEE
The sixth circuit's decision in Kewanee came into direct conflict
with a number of earlier circuit court decisions. These decisions
held that patent law and state trade secret law were not in con-
flict. Sears and Compco were distinguished usually on the
grounds that they did not involve the breach of the confidential
relationship that is inherent in a trade secret case.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Servo Corp. of America v. General Electric Co.,69 was the first
appellate court to consider the possible conflict between the
sweeping language of Sears and Compco and the state trade se-
cret laws. Briefly, Servo Corporation charged General Electric
with infringing three patents concerned with hot box detectors
69. 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934 (1966).
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for railroads. The court found all three patents invalid for lack
of invention and novelty. Servo also argued that General Elec-
tric was guilty of unfair competition in the misappropriation and
copying of their plans of the articles. Servo had installed a hot
box detector for the Southern Railroad on an experimental
basis with the understanding that Southern would not disclose
any information concerning the detector. However, a Southern
vice president met with a group of General Electric engineers
who visited the location of the hot box detector and took photo-
graphs of it. Subsequently, General Electric developed their own
hot box detector with many of the same features as Servo's.
The court of appeals reversed the district court and found General
Electric guilty of violating trade secrets belonging to Servo.
The court relied on two theories. First, it contended that
"courts long have recognized that where the holder of a trade
secret imparts it to another in confidence and that other person
then appropriates it for his own use, equitable remedies may be
invoked to right the wrong. °70 The court cited a number of cases
for this proposition, the most prominent being Hoeltke v. C.M.
Kemp Mfg. Co."1 This case held in part what while patent statutes
provided protection only when the patent had been granted, pro-
tection was also provided in advance of the granting of the patent
when a confidential relationship was broken. Protection is granted
"not under the patent statutes, but upon the principle that equity
will not permit one to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another.",2
Secondly, the court argued that the case was distinguishable
from Sears. The latter dealt with copying of an article. "This
case," according to the court, "is one of unjust enrichment through
breach of a confidential relationship, and the remedy is derived
from the Court's power to award general equitable relief. '78
The reasoning of the court, with its heavy dependence upon
equitable powers, is open to criticism from a number of directions.
It has been argued that the Servo court relied on its own federal
powers relating to unjust enrichment without considering state
law or state policy. 74 Furthermore, the relationship between
federal patent policy and a policy of unjust enrichment should
have been further analyzed, particularly because the trade se-
70. Id. at 723.
71. 80 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 673 (1936).
72. Id. at 923.
73. 337 F.2d at 725.
74. Doerfer, The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent
and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1432, 1452 (1967).
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crets had been granted patents which were declared invalid. The
court in Servo extended the monopoly period beyond that which
the patent laws were willing to grant, thereby interfering with
the right of General Electric to copy ideas which were now in
the public domain. Except for the possible distinguishing fact of
violation of a confidential relationship, this extension of protec-
tion to an unpatented article was the very thing which Sears and
Compco were attempting to prevent.
The court also failed to analyze its application of equitiable
power. These same powers had previously been used by various
courts to enjoin copying, 5 yet Sears and Compco specifically for-
bade the state to prohibit by statute the copying of an article.
From this it could be implied that courts similarly were forbid-
den to prohibit copying under theories of equity just as Sears and
Compco struck down legislative prohibitions against copying.
Otherwise, Sears and Compco would be rendered meaningless.
Precisely what was it that made the breach of some confidential
relationships inequitable? The breach of these relationships re-
sulted in the appropriation of ideas which the appropriator had
not himself developed in any way. However, it had been declared
in Sears and Compco that it was permissible for an appropri-
ator to copy an unpatented object exactly without any develop-
ment costs on his part, thereby resulting in a lower cost. The
appropriator could then undersell the original developer whose
creativity and ingenuity had produced the object in the first
place. Can these situations be distinguiished on the basis of
"equity"?
The phrase "confidential relationship" cannot serve as an all-
encompassing answer to this question. Despite Justice Holmes'
famous remarks76 and a considerable body of contrary state trade
secret cases,7 7 it can be argued that it is necessary to look beyond the
means by which the trade secret was obtained (e.g., the breach
of the confidential relationship) to at least some of the character-
istics of the information which makes up the trade secret. To a
certain extent, such substantive analysis is implicit in the very
notion of a trade secret, for the state really does not have a legiti-
75. See CALLmAN, supra note 25, at §§ 16.2(d), 16.3 and cases cited
therein.
76. "The property may be denied but the confidence cannot be. There-
fore the starting point for the present matter is not property or due
process of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential relations
with the plaintiffs, or one of them." DuPont Powder Co. v. Masland,
244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
77. See CALLmAN, supra note 25, at §§ 51.1, 51.2 and cases cited therein.
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mate state interest in protecting confidential relationships per se.
Rather, its interest is in maintaining a stable economic condition
where certain relationships in a business context remain confiden-
tial and thus not subject to sudden disruption with resultant fi-
nancial hardship to one party. Even using this simple analysis,
it is necessary for the state to determine if the relationship is
in a business or personal sphere, and if financial hardship is in-
volved. In short, the subject matter of the trade secret should be
examined.
Such analysis of the allegedly secret information becomes crit-
ical when Sears and Compco are reconsidered. Justice Black did
not focus in those cases on the means by which the object was
produced the direct copying of a pre-existing article. Instead, he
examined the subject matter of -the article-the invalidity of patent.
By shifting the emphasis from the means by which the article was
produced to the subject matter of the article, the state's impact
upon free competition by extending the monopoly period is more
apparent. It is no longer necessary to focus solely upon the
means, find them somehow morally reprehensible, and then fail
to examine the subject matter of the article and its impact upon
free competition.
Likewise, it would be logical to extend such an analysis to
trade secret law. Instead of focusing only upon the means by
which the secret was obtained as the Servo opinion did, thereby
failing to even reach the question of the effect of the protection
of trade secrets upon free competition, it might have been prefer-
able to examine the subject matter of the trade secret, as well. In
Servo, the subject matter was patentable, in fact, patents had been
declared invalid, and so the state was in effect extending a trade
secret monopoly when the patent monopoly was invalidated.
It should be carefully noted that considering the subject mat-
ter does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the means by
which the information was obtained was permissible. It is entirely
possible that the court will decide that the misappropriation of
trade secrets does indeed outweigh the advantages of free compe-
tition. But some sort of balancing test should be articulated so
that the subject matter of the trade secret and its impact on free
competition will at least be considered. The point is that concepts
inherent in phrases such as "confidential relationship" should be
elements to be considered, and not cure-alls in themselves.
It is worthy of note that at least three of the trade secrets
which were violated in Servo also fell within the ambit of patent
laws. This raises the question of whether an article can be pro-
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tected by both patent law and trade secret law at the same time.
At least one early case holds that patent law and trade secret pro-
tection can coexist. 78 This proposition has been at least partly
upheld by Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co.Y9 While
mere application for a patent probably does not destroy the trade
secret, as the application does not constitute public disclosure, 0
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, with
Judge Learned Hand writing, has held that -the issuance of a patent
ends trade secret protection. "Thus, any possible [trade secret]
liability for exploiting whatever the patents in suit disclosed, ended
with their issue."81
Such a conclusion would be in harmony with both the patent
regulations and Sears and Compco. According to the patent regu-
lations, "the specification must include a written description of
the invention ... and is required to be in such full, clear, concise
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art or science
... to make and use the same."8 2 Furthermore, this information
is open to inspection by the general public.8 3 Logically, if the
patent holder has fully complied with these regulations there would
be no need for a competitor to resort to violating any trade secret
because the information is already openly available. Moreover a
trade secret must actually be some sort of a secret,84 and informa-
78. While the defendant could lawfully copy the pump, because it
had been published to the world, he could not lawfully copy
the patterns [which made up an integral part of the pump]
because they had not been published, but were still, in every
sense, the property of the plaintiff, who owned not only the
material substance, but also the discovery which they embod-
ied.
Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 37, 23 N.E. 12, 13 (1889).
79. 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936). However, the factual pattern was some-
what different from Servo because the infringer by its inequitable
conduct had "precluded itself from enjoying the rights of the general
public to patent disclosure .... " Id. at 108.
80. At the time of the application the inventor or discoverer has
no means of knowing whether the patent will ultimately be
granted. If the secret is valuable, the discoverer, conceiving
it to be patentable, would by making application hazard both
secret and patent. This would defeat the very purpose of
the patent law, which conditions monopoly for a limited pe-
riod upon the complete surrender thereafter of the subject
matter to the public ....
A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 537 (6th
Cir. 1934). Furthermore, the Patent Office must keep applications
confidential 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1970).
81. Conmar Prod. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150,
156 (2d Cir. 1949).
82. 37 C.F.R. § 1.71(a) (1973).
83. Id. § 1.12.
84. "The significant difference of fact between trade secrets and processes
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tion which is open to anybody can scarcely be termed a secret. To
punish one who obtained this information through the breach of a
confidential relationship is to concentrate exclusively upon the
means by which the information was obtained and to ignore the
subject matter of the information (in this case, the actual lack of
any secrecy).
The Servo court seems to be directly contrary to the lan-
guage of Sears and Compco and the statutes. The court in Servo
had determined that the objects were not a great enough advance-
ment over the prior state of the art to warrant any patent protec-
tion and, therefore, declared the patents invalid. The Court
then applied state trade secret law, however, to allow one type
of monopoly where they had just stated that they were not going
to allow a patent monopoly. It could be argued that a trade secret
monopoly has different rights and liabilities, but it is a monop-
oly, none the less.
The Sears opinion seems directly on point as it was also con-
cerned with patents which had been declared invalid, with the
state then attempting to impose a penalty for unfair competition.
To repeat an earlier quote,
To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to pre-
vent the copying of an article which represents too slight an ad-
vance to be patented would be to permit the State to block off
from the public something which federal law has said belongs to
the public.S5
A more sophisticated analysis of the problem was made in
or devices which are not secret is that knowledge of the latter is
available to the copier without the use of improper means to procure
it, while knowledge of the former is ordinarily available to him only
by the use of such means." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment
a at 3 (1939) (emphasis added).
85. 376 U.S. at 231-32. The next appellate court to consider the possible
conflict between federal patent law and state trade secret law was
the Illinois Supreme Court. In Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill.
2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965), an employee copied confidential infor-
mation disclosed to him in the employee-employer relationship and
then used this information to start a competing business. As in
Servo, the court dealt wholly with the means by which the informa-
tion was obtained. The notion that the language of Sears and
Compco might be applicable was quickly dismissed. "It is readily
apparent that the Sears and Compco cases do not cover a situation
of industrial espionage by employees who plan to organize a com-
peting company and thereafter do that very thing." Id. at 386, 212
N.E.2d at 869. In so holding, the Illinois court did not consider the
implications of such a decision upon free competition, but concen-
trated their attention upon punishing what the court considered to
be a morally reprehensible act.
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Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing
Co.88 Here the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit was faced with a situation in which employees of Minnesota
Mining had misappropriated information and thus were able to
produce a competing tape recorder long before it would otherwise
have been possible. The court stated that it was precluded by Sears
and Compco from giving weight to the contention that "[t]he re-
sults of research and development must be accorded reasonable
protection from disclosure or private investment in such activities
will be inhibited and progress will be slowed, with consequent
loss to both employers and public."87 The court made a firm dis-
tinction between the information and the relationship: "[Sears]
... precludes judicial individual recognition of a legally protect-
able interest in the secrecy of industrial information as such, as
distinguished from an interest in the integrity of confidential em-
ployer-employee relationships."8 8  In a note, the court further
explained this distinction:
It would seem to follow, under the rationale of Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., that state law providing protection for trade
secrets cannot be applied to serve a premise that the balance of
interests favors secrecy. Thus, state law protecting trade secrets
cannot be based "on a policy of rewarding or otherwise encourag-
ing the development of secret processes or devices. The protec-
tion is merely against breach of faith and reprehensible means of
learning another's secrets." Restatement, Torts § 757, comment b.89
The ninth circuit's reasoning is a considerable advance over
that of the fourth circuit in Servo. Instead of applying the vague
principle that general equity powers should uphold confidential
relations, Winston focused upon the confidential relationship and
clearly stated that the information itself is not protectable. At
best, Servo only implied such a distinction. By so distinguishing,
Winston does not directly grant a monopoly of the sort that Sears
and Compco struck down in their decisions concerning copying.
Under Winston, the state is no longer concerned with protecting
the actual item itself, whether it is an article which is being copied
or information which has been disclosed, but instead is allowed to
protect a relationship which appears to be separate from the ac-
tual information.
The difficulty is that the state is indirectly protecting the in-
formation by protecting the relationship. While it is true that the
information is no longer directly protected by the state, the court
86. 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965).
87. Id. at 138.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 138 n.2.
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should also be concerned with whether the information should
be protected indirectly, if at all. Assuming, arguendo, that the
features in the tape recorder were indeed patentable, the state is
granting the featured potentially indefinite protection by impos-
ing legal liability upon one who discloses that information. If the
features were not patentable, then the state is allowing protection
for the features of the sort that would not be granted at all by
the federal government under patent law. The protection granted
by the state is a limited one-only as long as the feature is
indeed a trade secret (i.e., it would disappear if it were discov-
ered through reverse-engineering) and only as to those employees
who were in the confidential relationship-but it is still a limit
upon the free introduction of that feature by competitors in their
products.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit faced
the question of possible conflict between trade secret law and
patent law in Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chemicals, Inc.90
An employee signed a covenant not to compete with his former
employer, Farris Chemical Company, in a certain prescribed area
in northern Georgia. The employee not only broke his covenant,
but he also disclosed trade secrets to defendant Tesco Chemicals.
While some of these trade secrets involved the make-up of me-
chanical components of a water purifier, at least one very signifi-
cant trade secret which was disclosed was a list of suppliers. The
employee was held liable both for breaking the covenant not to
compete and for the disclosure of trade secrets.
Writing for the Court, Judge Wisdom first briefly analyzed the
necessity for trade secrets:
The policy reasons for affording protection to these commercial
intangibles are to prevent exploitation by reprehensible business
methods and to encourage innovation .... If a trade secret is
protected, the competitive advantage realized by the owner of the
secret will enable him to recoup his developmental costs, hopefully
before his competitors can "reverse-engineer" the product and du-plicate it.91
Judge Wisdom then distinguished this trade secret case from
Sears and Compco in much the same way as the Servo court did,
stating that Sears and Compco were not applicable to a situation in
which an employer hires an employee of a competitor in order to
obtain a trade secret.
After discussing the differences between patents and trade se-
90. 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969).
91. Id. at 171.
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cret protection, Judge Wisdom analyzed the factors involved in
this case:
The anticompetitive effects [of the trade secret protection] are
relatively slight since the competitive advantage exists only for
which is usually a short period of time, because the restrictive
covenant, if there be one, is for a small number of years (here,
only two years) or because a competitor, by reverse-engineer-
ing, may legitimately duplicate the device. This limited protec-
tion with its relatively slight anticompetitive effects is helpful to
ensure growth characteristics of innovative genius. See Doerfer,
The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent and
Anti-Trust Supremacy, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1432, 1447-56 (1967).92
Thus, at least in the actual reasoning of his opinion, Judge
Wisdom was not depending upon the confidential relationship
solely. Rather, he weighed the possible restriction on free com-
petition, resulting from both the restrictive covenant and the trade
secret, against the policy of protecting confidential relationships
in a business context. To use the language previously articulated,
Judge Wisdom did not focus solely on the means by which the
information was obtained, and, having found the means repre-
hensible, hold the discloser liable. Instead, he also considered the
subject matter of the information and its possible impact on free
competition. Judge Wisdom then found the means reprehensi-
ble.93
One problem with Judge Wisdom's analysis is that he did not
differentiate the types of trade secrets involved. Part of the dis-
closed information consisted of the arrangement of various com-
ponents in such a way to produce the water treatment industry's
only fully-automated, integrated system for controlling and sup-
plying purified industrial water. There was no patent involved,
yet the process was certainly suitable material for a patent.9
92. Id. at 172.
93. Perhaps this interpretation is reading too much into the process by
which Judge Wisdom made his decision. First, the weighing of alter-
natives is common when restrictive covenants are involved, and a
major cause of action in this case was such a covenant. It is possible
trade secret law and restrictive covenant law were merged in the
two sentences quoted above, text accompanying note 92, supra, with-
out really balancing any alternatives as to trade secrets alone. Sec-
ond, appellate courts sometimes reason one way in their chambers
and another way in their opinion. It is possible that the court in
fact considered only the reprehensible means by which the informa-
tion was obtained. To support this contention, it should be noted
that the second paragraph of the court's opinion states, "Glad [the
disclosing employee] will not be allowed to bite the hand that fed
him his expertise." 410 F.2d at 164.
94. "Whoever invents or discloses any new and useful process, machine,
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Evidently, Farris Chemical decided that it would rather have
strict security and rely on trade secret law than take the chance
that its innovations would not reach the level of originality
required for a patent. What Farris was doing, in essence, was
substituting trade secret protection for patent protection. How-
ever, as was argued earlier in the discussion of Winston, this
means that the state is in fact limiting free competition under
the guise of protecting confidential relationships. The sweeping
language of Sears and Compco is such that it is questionable
whether the state does in fact have such a power to regulate un-
patented items which could be regulated via the patent laws.
Another part of the disclosed information consisted of a list
of the suppliers of components for Farris' water treatment sys-
tem. While it could be argued that the state was limiting free
competition by protecting the list, such a protection does seem per-
missible. The trade list is not suitable material to be patented,
so it falls completely outside the scope of the patent laws. It cannot
be argued reasonably that the patent laws preempted trade secret
law in regard to the trade list.95
But it can be argued strongly in this case that these trade secrets
were so far outside the scope of patent laws that no preemption
of trade secret law was possible. On the other hand, an argu-
ment can be made that when an item is patentable, the patent
laws rather than trade secret laws should govern in order to pro-
mote free competition. The difficulty is when the item falls be-
tween these two extremes. How close to patentability can the
item be and still receive protection of trade secret law?
manufacture, or composition of matter, or of any new and useful im-
provement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the con-
ditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
95. It could be contended that the patent and copyright clause of the
Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, is broad enough to include trade
lists. Because Congress failed to include trade lists as suitable subject
material under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970), it has in effect decreed that
trade lists should not receive any protection at all. Such an argu-
ment would be supported by a literal reading of the Goldstein court's
reference to the all-encompassing nature of patent statutes. See note
66 and accompanying text supra. However, as was argued earlier,
Goldstein should not be read literally in this context. The court
failed to analyze why the copyright and patent statutes should be
construed so differently. Patent protection (and the field preempted
by patent protection) should be limited to those articles which are
suitable subject material for a patent, i.e., "any new and useful proc-
ess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101
(1970). It seems evident that if trade lists are to receive any protec-
tion at all it must be from trade secret law and not from patent
law.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
used the language in Sears and Compco to limit an injunction
against a former employee who surreptitiously copied blue-prints
in the case of Hampton v. Blair Manufacturing Co.96 The court
stated, "The reasoning of Sears and Day-Brite and the holdings
therein compels the holding here that Hampton cannot be per-
manently enjoined from duplicating or copying Kelly Ryan un-
patented instruments."97 The court did not discuss the possibility
that Sears and Compco might preempt trade secret law or other-
wise attempt to distinguish Hampton from Sears and Compco. Like-
wise it did not explain why Sears and Compco could be used to
limit an injunction concerning trade secrets, but not also be ap-
plicable in determining whether the employee was liable for any-
thing at all, as the plans were unpatented.
In 1971, after Lear, the ninth circuit in Dekar Industries, Inc.
v. Bissett-Berman Corp.98 considered the validity of a preliminary
injunction restraining a former employee from exploiting the
plaintiff's trade secrets. The court very quickly disposed of the
arugment that Sears and Compco were applicable by reference
to the reasoning of Servo: "Nor do the Sears-Compco rules prevent
equitable relief for the misuse of trade secrets by those who are
bound by a confidential relationship or by an express or implied
agreement to maintain secrecy."99 The court also refused to dis-
cuss the Lear decision:
The same observation [as in note 99 supra] is valid with reference
to two other cases urged upon by the defendants-Lear, Inc. v. Ad-
kina and Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Development
Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1970)-in both, the claims rested on
"straight copying," no confidential relationship was involved.100
In short, the ninth circuit did not attempt to analyze the possible
preemption problem any further than the Servo decision did some
seven years earlier.
The factual pattern of Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc.,101 decided
by the second circuit, was somewhat different from the above
decisions. Painton and Bourns both developed potentiometers.
Bourns contracted to furnish to Painton confidential information
to produce their potentiometer in return for royalties. When the
the contract finally expired, Bourns demanded that the informa-
96. 374 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1967).
97. Id. at 973.
93. 434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1970).
99. Id. at 1306.
100. Id. at 1306 n.5.
101. 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
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tion be returned. Painton refused. Both parties requested dec-
latory judgments to uphold their positions. The district court held
against Bourns, stating that "federal patent policy ... will not
allow state trade secret claims against a party who has expressly
contracted for them when there has been no patent applica-
tion."102
The court of appeals reversed the district court and held that
patent law and trade secret law did not conflict. The district
court's decision was interpreted as being based on two policy argu-
ments. First, the district court argued that an agreement requir-
ing payment for trade secrets should not be recognized by the
state because such recognition would be in conflict with Sears
and Compco. Writing for court of appeals, Judge Friendly distin-
guished Painton from Sears and Comoco on the basis that in
those cases
[t]he Illinois law afforded protection quite similar to that given
by the patent and copyright statutes but free from their safeguards
and limits of time. An agreement licensing a trade secret is an
altogether different matter. It binds no one except the licensee;
all others are free as the licensee previously was to attempt by
fair means to figure out what the secret is and, if they succeed,
to practice it. See Speedry Chemical Products, Inc. v .Carters Ink
Co., 306 F.2d 328, 330 (2d Cir. 1962). Rather than having a mo-
nopolistic tendency, like the Illinois law involved in Sears and
Compco, the upholding of private agreements for the sharing of
trade secrets on mutually acceptable terms tends against the own-
er's hoarding them. See 84 Harv. L. Rev. at 484.103
Judge Friendly then considered the district court's second
major contention that protecting trade secrets in advance of the
filing of patent applications is against public policy as it would
discourage patent applications. The inventor would elect, the dis-
trict court reasoned, to take trade secret protection and so the in-
formation would never be publicly disclosed. In reply, the court of
appeals asserted that three categories of trade secrets should be
distinguished: "(1) the trade secret believed by its owner to consti-
tute a validly patentable invention; (2) the trade secret is known
to its owner not to be so patentable; and (3) the trade secret
whose valid patentability is considered dubious.' 10 4
As to the first category, Judge Friendly argued that the li-
censor would not, intelligently, sacrifice his patent application in
favor of trade secret protection. On the one hand, trade secret pro-
102. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271, 276 n.12 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
103. 442 F.2d at 223.
104. Id. at 224.
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tection could be lost forever if the secret escaped through reverse-
engineering or if a breach of a confidential relationship cannot be
proven. On the other hand, the inventor would forever lose his
right to obtain a patent if he did not apply within a year of pub-
licly using it,105 and another inventor could later secure a patent
on the same device.100 The Court contended:
This shows that any conflict between patent policy and trade se-
cret agreements in the context being here considered is readily re-
solved not by refusing to enforce a trade secret agreement but
rather by refusing to grant or uphold a patent when the inventor
has unduly delayed his application after the invention has been
put to use.107
As for the second category, where the inventor knows the
trade secret not to be patentable, "there can be no public interest
in stimulating developers of such know-how to flood an over-
burdened Patent Office with applications on what they do not
consider patentable. o108 Still, the development of such practical
know-how should be encouraged, and one way to do so is to al-
low the inventor to license his trade secret.
In instances where the granting of a valid patent is dubious,
the invalidation of trade secret agreements would stimulate pat-
ent application, but
[t]he beneficial effect even here is by no means clear. If the patent
does not issue, there will have been an unnecessary postponement
in the divulging of the trade secret to persons willing to pay for it.
If it does, it may well be invalid, yet many will prefer to pay a
modest royalty than contest it, .... The result in such a case
would be unjustified royalty payments from many who would
prefer not to pay them rather than agreed fees from one or a few
who are entirely willing to do so.' 0 9
Finally, the court argued that numerous arms-length con-
tracts existed where competitors divulged trade secrets with the
faith that the courts would protect the agreements and enjoin
further use of the trade secrets upon termination of the contract.
In the absence of empirical evidence of harm, a settled rule of con-
tract law on which so much has been staked should not be over-
turned save on a clear showing that it is inconsistent with other
rules of higher sanction or that conditions that gave it birth no
longer prevail. There has been no such showing here.l0
105. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970).
106. Id. § 102(g).
107. 442 F.2d at 224.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 225.
110. Id. at 226.
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Thus, Judge Friendly is not content to simply label particular
information as "disclosed in a confidential relationship" and there-
fore enjoin the use of that information under the "general equity
power of the court." Rather, instead of concentrating upon the
means by which the secret was obtained, he is also willing to ana-
lyze the subject material of the trade secret. This is especially evi-
dent in his discussion of the impact that the removal of trade secret
protection would have on the holders of patentable, unpatentable,
and doubtfully patentable trade secrets, and the total influence
that such a removal would have on the system of free competi-
tion.
Judge Friendly's analysis is similar to the analysis advocated
by this comment. Neither the means by which the information
was obtained nor the subject material of that information should
be of sole importance. Rather, both factors should be consid-
ered so that the overall impact on both the free competition of
ideas and the protection of the inventor can be understood more
fully.
It is necessary to consider both elements because of the com-
peting social policies behind each. Free competition of ideas
must be considered in order to avoid burdensome monopolies
which would result in needlessly expensive goods. At the same
time, protection of the inventor's ideas must also be considered as
a means of providing incentive to the inventor by allowing him
to reap the benefits of his invention. When these policies con-
flict, specific consideration of both elements is of assistance in ar-
ticulating a result which properly balances the competing ele-
ments.
The actual application of this balance between the competing
elements will depend upon the individual case before the court.
Judge Friendly's analysis in Painton of the various policies under-
lying components of posssible patentability of an object or Judge
Wisdom's investigation in Water Services of the exact amount of
protection which would be granted by a trade secret are good ex-
amples of considering the diverse elements present in a trade se-
cret case.
Before Kewanee, appellate courts did not recognize fully the
conflict between patent law and trade secret law. Rather than
apply the sweeping language of Sears, Compco and Lear, which
clearly implied a trend toward federal preemption, the appellate
courts distinguished trade secret cases from those Supreme Court
cases. The appellate courts before Kewanee emphasized the confi-
dential relationships present in the trade secret cases, while the
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Supreme Court cases dealt with what the courts mostly termed
"straight copying." Some courts, such as Servo and Dekar, focused
almost entirely upon the means by which the information was ob-
tained. Other courts, especially Water Services and Painton,
indicated to a certain extent that they were at least noticing the
subject material of the trade secret as well.
V. PATENT PREEMPTION PROBLEM
On May 10, 1973, Judge Kent of the United States Court of ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit held in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp."' that federal patent law preempted state trade secret law.
Thus, we feel compelled to conclude that a state trade secret
law which protects an inventor in the maintenance of a monopoly
of a device which is an appropriate subject for patent under the
United States Patent Laws is in conflict with the policies and
purposes of those patent laws where the invention has been used
commercially for more than one year.112
In so holding, the court explicitly recognized that it was in con-
flict with a number of other circuits.1 13 As mentioned previously,
essentially the Kewanee court applied the federal preemption
trend one step further to state trade secret laws." 4
111. 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973).
112. Id. at 1086.
113. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971); Dekar
Indus., Inc. v. Bissett-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971); Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems.,
Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969); Servo Corp. of America v. General
Elec. Corp., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934
(1966).
114. Two other decisions foreshadowed the result of Kewanee. First, on
July 24, 1964, the California Superior Court for Los Angeles County,
Calif., considered Titelock Strip Co. v. Klasner, 142 U.S.P.Q. 405 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1964). The case involved industrial espionage of the raw-
est sort. Klasner, an expert precision-machinist, received a menial
position with Titelock and had the opportunity to inspect the only
machine in southern California which manufactured wire-tackless
carpet strip. Shortly after leaving Titelock's employ, Klasner set up
a machine which was identical to Titelock's. There was some evi-
dence that many of the parts for Klasner's machine had been physic-
ally appropriated from Titelock's premises.
The court found Klasner liable for $250 for the value of metal
taken from Titelock, and enjoined Klasner from soliciting any of
Titelock's regular customers for two years. However, the court re-
fused to find Klasner guilty of misappropriating trade secrets, stating,
The defendants obtained, "for free," the advantage of all of
this experimental effort, cost, and time expenditure and thus
saved themselves the cost in time and labor that would have
been entailed if they had set out to design and fabricate such
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The facts of Kewanee can be stated briefly. Over a period of
16 years, Kewanee was able to establish a process for growing a
synthetic crystal 17 inches long. A number of employees left Ke-
wanee and formed Bicron Corporation. Bicron was able to grow a
17-inch crystal within a space of nine months rather than the
16 years it took Kewanee.
On this record, as a whole, it appears clear to us, as it did to the
District Court, that the individual defendants used the information
obtained during their employment by Harshaw [which in turn
controlled Kewanee Oil] for the benefit of Bicron. There can be no
question on this record but what these individual defendants ap-
propriated, to the benefit of Bicron, Harshaw's secrets, processes,
procedures and manufacturing techniques. 115
a machine from scratch. This however, if a wrong, is a
wrong which only the patent laws can protect an inventor
against.
Id. at 407.
In Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State Advertis-
ing Co., 444 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1971), the ninth circuit considered a
suit over a contract by which Golden State acknowledged the validity
of Massillon's patent and promised not to infringe. The court de-
clared such a contract to be "void and on its face unenforceable. It
is in just as direct conflict with the 'strong Federal policy' referred
to repeatedly in Lear, as was the estoppel." Id. at 427. The second
allegation by Massillon, that Albert Gold, president of Golden State,
induced the breach of contract, is relevant:
Without the inducement, the contract and the patent would
have been honored. Thus, the act of inducing the breach,
perhaps even more so than the act of breaching the contract,
exemplifies a willingness to shoulder the burden of vindicat-
ing the public interest .... Needless to say, one inducing
the breach of such a contract, as well as one inducing the
infringement of a patent, runs the risk that he may not be
able to establish patent invalidity. Nothing said herein is
intended to commend one who induces the infringement of
a valid patent, or who induces the breach of a contract not
to infringe a valid patent. But we are of the opinion that
a valid patent is a prerequisite to recovery for inducing the
breach of a contract not to infringe, as well as a prerequisite
to recovery for the breach itself.
Id. at 428.
Thus, the court refused to find liability on what would otherwise
have been the tort of inducing the breach of a contract because the
enforcement of that liability would also partially enforce (at least
as far as damages) a contract which had just been declared void
as against federal patent policy. The court focused upon the subject
of the contract, and determined that its subject matter had been pre-
empted by patent law and therefore should not be protected under
tort law. They were not willing to limit their examination to the
means by which the contract was broken, i.e., the inducement. They
focused, instead, on the subject matter of the contract, i.e., the non-
patentable article.
115. 478 F,2d at 1076-77,
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The district court found Bicron Corporation liable for violating
Kewanee's trade secrets. The court of appeals also found that
Bircon had misappropriated Kewanee's trade secrets, but reversed
the district court as to any liability arising from such a violation.
The court of appeals began by discussing the contents of the
information to determine the extent to which the trade secret was
patentable. "First, the trade secrets in question relating to the
processes, procedures and manufacturing techniques of Harshaw,
as conceded by counsel for Kewanee, were 'patentable.' That is
appropriate subjects for consideration under the provisions of Ti-
tle 35 U.S.C. § 101."'116 Furthermore,, the trade secrets had been
in commercial use for more than one year,1 17 and so Kewanee
was not eligible for a patent under Title 35 of the United States
Code, section 102(6). That section states:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-(6) the invention was
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United
States.118
The counsel for Kewanee conceded that "[o]ne of the princi-
pal purposes of maintaining the secrecy of inventions, including
those here involved, as opposed to seekiing patents under the
Patent Laws would be to extend the commercial monopoly of the
invention beyond the 17 years granted by the patent laws."11 9
The court as a result took note of the subject matter of the
trade secret, instead of focusing solely upon the means by which
the trade secret was obtained. The court realized the impact on
free competition and that Kewanee was in fact using the state
trade secret laws in an attempt to receive protection for a longer
span of time than would be possible under the federal patent
laws. In short, by its own admission, Kewanee was attempting to
subvert the purpose of federal patent laws, which establish a
limited monopoly for a limited time.
The court then reviewed the historical background of patent
litigation in the United States since colonial days. Throughout its
116. Id. at 1078. "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful proc-
ess, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to
the conditions and requirements of this title .... " 35 U.S.C. § 101
(1970).
117. The Court stated: "The use of an invention in secret for commercial
purposes is considered public use.* Huszar v. Cincinnati Chemical
Works, 172 F.2d 6, 80 U.S.P.Q. 466 (6th Cir. 1949)." 478 F.2d at 1078.
118. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970).
119. 478 F.2d at 1078.
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analysis, the court cited a number of cases which stated that the
patent monopoly was a limited one, both as to the time limit
of the monopoly and the subject matter which could be protected.
"[T]he language of certain early cases suggests that the Supreme
Court was of the opinion that the Patent Laws provided the ex-
clusive means and remedies for the protection of inventors, and
that no other monopoly was possible.' 1 20
The problem with the court's historical analysis is that almost
all of the cases that they cited dealt with nonconfidential relation-
ships. 121 This comment has contended that a number of circuit
courts have erred in focusing purely upon the means by which
the information was obtained; however, such means are still the
proper subject of one element to be considered. The phrase
"confidential relationship" has been used as an all-encompassing
answer which immediately stops any possible analysis of the sub-
ject material of the trade secret (e.g., its possible patentability).
The courts accordingly ignore the possible implications that the
imposition of trade secret protection might have upon free com-
120. Id. at 1081 (emphasis original).
121. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg.
Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945); Tappan Co. v. General Motors Corp., 380
F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1967). The one case the court did cite which con-
cerned trade secrets was Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322(1858), but this case was miscited. It involved an inventor who de-
pended on the complexity of his perfected machine to protect him
from duplication, and so decided to retain trade secret protection
rather than attempt to obtain a patent. An employee copied the
plans for the machine and sold them to a competitor. Kewanee
quotes the Court as stating, "By correct induction from these truths,
it follows, that the inventor who designedly, and with the view of
applying it indefinitely and exclusively for his own profit, withholds
his invention from the public, comes not within the policy or objects
of the Constitution or acts of Congress." Id. at 328. What Kewanee
fails to mention is that the Supreme Court found the manufacturer
who misappropriated the trade secrets liable for breaching a confiden-
tial relationship.
But, whilst inventors are bound to diligence and fairness in
their dealings with the public, with reference to their discov-
eries on the other hand, they are by obligations equally
strong entitled to protection against frauds or wrongs prac-
ticed to pirate from them the results of thought and labor,
in which nearly a lifetime may have been exhausted; ....
Id. at 329. Thus, Kewanee's citing of this case for the proposition
that the Supreme Court has implied that patent law somehow over-
rides trade secret law is misleading. The result in Kendall was that
the employee was held liable for violating a trade secret, whereas
in Kewanee the employee was not held liable although he did vio-
late a trade secret.
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petition. Instead of such a mechanical applications of the law as
implied by Servo122 it might be better to consider the diverse ele-
ments of the particular case which may assist or hinder the sys-
tem of free competition.
It is also possible, however, to manipulate such cases as Sears,
Compco and Lear and the patent laws in a similar, mechanical
way so that the court considers only the subject material, in this
case the possible patentability of the trade secret, and does not
consider the means by which the information was obtained, in this
case the misappropriation of information which was disclosed to
the defendants while they were employees and so in a confidential
relationship. In either situation (confidential relationship or sub-
ject matter analysis, but not both) the crucial test-the actual ef-
fect upon free competition-is not treated explicitly. Instead, it
is the premise of this paper that both elements, the means by
which the trade secret was obtained and the subject matter of
that trade secret, should be examined. By considering both ele-
ments, the underlying social policies can be articulated better and
such policies can be balanced in a rational manner. The dangers
of a non-patent monopoly can be considered against the benefits
of providing incentive to an inventor.
The courts should have specifically noted the diverse elements,
both the subject matter of the trade secret and the means by
which it was obtained, and then determined which elements they
chose to weigh heavily and which they chose to disregard. Ke-
wanee, like Servo, fails to examine the policy arguments but
simply makes a flat statement, that
[o]ur analysis of the relationship between the Patent Laws of the
United States and the Trade Secret Laws of the State of Ohio, as
applied in this case, forces us to the conclusion that the field of
protection afforded to this plaintiff by that Trade Secret Law has
been preempted by the Patent Laws of the United States.123
The Kewanee decision seems to be ignoring a number of important
factors by concentrating only on the content of the information
and completely ignoring the means by which that information
was obtained.
From a purely practical standpoint, it would seem that Ke-
wanee would make the carrying on of research or development by
a corporation more difficult. Such research must be carried out
by employees who are to be entrusted with information which
might be of considerable importance to a competitor. If the pos-
122. See note 69 and accompanying text supra.
123. 478 F.2d at 1087.
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sible coercive force of potential liability for disclosing a trade
secret is removed, the corporation can depend only on loy-
alty of its employees or the ability to outbid the competitor, if it
discovers the employee is about to reveal the information. To
keep the information secret, the corporation might feel com-
pelled to segment the research as much as possible so that no
single employee could disclose an entire idea which would harm
the employer. Such segmentation, however, could impair seri-
ously the efficiency of the research and development.
Pre-existing agreements by which the employee agreed at some
past time not to disclose the secret information also raise a prob-
lem. If all such agreements now are rendered void, the confusion
in the business world could be considerable. No employer could
be certain what information might suddenly turn up in the hands
of a competitor. Furthermore, some employees could, in effect,
blackmail their employer by threatening to disclose information
to a competitor.
Kewanee's argument that the preemption of trade secret law
applies only to patentable objects is also open to criticism. Ex-
actly what constitutes an appropriate subject for a patent is a very
unclear and ambiguous area. Almost the only way in which an
inventor is able to discover for certain whether his invention can
meet the standards of patentability is to actually submit his inven-
tion to the Patent Office, and once patented, it is entirely possible
that his patent will be declared invalid at a later date by the
judicial system. In short, the inventor will have a very difficult
problem determining the protection which his invention can re-
ceive. Perhaps the only way he can legally protect himself is to
send any object which might even remotely meet the patent stand-
ards to the Patent Office and hope that protection might some-
how be granted. This would result in a great influx of spurious
developments being pressed upon the Patent Office, which may or
may not be able to handle this mass of applications.
Even if an invention is ultimately suitable for a patent, the
question arises as to when the patent protection should begin.
Should patent protection be extended back to the early devel-
opment stages? During such early development, the object obvi-
ously is not appropriate subject matter for a patent, but if devel-
opment continues the object might ultimately be novel enough to
begin the patent application process. What if information concern-
ing the object is disclosed at this early stage? The only alterna-
tive open to the inventor would be to immediately apply for a
patent upon the conception of any idea which might possibly be
appropriate subject matter for a patent in order to obtain bet-
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ter protection. Again, this would result in a great influx of spur-
ious applications. Clearly, granting patent protection at the
very conception of the invention has grave problems, as the inven-
tion is unlikely to have the requisite uniqueness at such an early
stage.
Another possible solution is to require that the invention be
developed enough to meet present patent standards, and then
apply patent protection retroactively to the date of original con-
ception. However, can any such particular date of original con-
ception be found when the invention is a result of a continuous
developmental program, where new ideas are constantly discov-
ered and merged with other new or preexisting ideas so as to
eventually result in an invention suitable for patenting? Unfor-
tunately, the Kewanee court does not consider any of these dif-
culties.
Finally, the Kewanee opinion could have an effect upon the
foreign trade of the United States. If trade secrets dealing with
patentable objects are declared to be preempted by patent law,
then it logically follows that licenses of trade secrets should be-
declared void as such licenses would result in royalties for an ob-
ject which is not entitled to any protection except patent protec-
tion. One author estimates that $1 billion in licenses of American
industry to foreign enterprise, involving know-how or equity-type
transactions, would be threatened by the preemption of trade se-
cret law.1 2 4
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has recently heard oral
arguments in Kewanee.1 25 In deciding the case, the Court prob-
ably will have to consider many of the elements which have
been discussed in this comment. The basic problem that the
Court will have to face is how to promote the free exchange
of ideas in order to stimulate competition, while at the same time
providing the inventor adequate protection so that he can gain
benefit from his invention. To be more specific, the Court will
have to determine the relationship between federal patent law
and state trade secret law with respect to objects which are po-
tentially patentable.
A key statutory provision the Court must consider is Title 35
of the United States Code, Section 102(b) which provides that no
124. Milgram, Sears to Lear to Painton: Of Whales and Other Matters,
46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 17, 26-27 (1971).
125. 42 U.S.L.W. 3397 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1974).
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patent will be granted if "the invention was patented . . . or in
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior
to the date of the application for the patent in the United States."1 2 6
As "public use" includes secret use as a trade secret, for profit,
the trade secrets in Kewanee probably are no longer eligible
for a patent.
If protection from the federal system of patents is no longer
possible, should state protection via trade secret law be allowed?
Or, should trade secret law be preempted by patent law as to
objects which are potentially patentable: if any protection at all
is to be granted, must it come from the patent system?
As was discussed in Section III of this comment, the United
States Supreme Court has articulated a policy of federal patent
preemption as to a number of aspects of state unfair competition
law and state contract law in Sears, Compco, Brulotte, and Lear.
Although none of these cases dealt directly with trade secret
law, they do indicate that the Court was unwilling to allow the
state to extend significantly the statutory monopoly established
by the patent statutes. 127 The extent of which the Supreme Court
will allow patent preemption as to state trade secret law, how-
ever, is unclear after Goldstein. This case was concerned with
state protection of recorded material which a federal law specific-
ally exempted from federal copyright protection. The Supreme
Court upheld the state protection, clearly implying that federal
preemption had limits.
Even before Goldstein, federal appellate courts128 refused to ex-
tend the trend of federal patent preemption to trade secret law, as
was discussed in Section IV. For the most part, these courts
simply stated that the trend toward preemption articulated in
Sears and Compco was not applicable because Sears and Compco
dealt with copying, not with the breach of a confidential relation-
ship. This comment has contended that trade secret protection
in fact creates a monopoly in an instance where the federal
patent system probably would not allow a patent monopoly. To
be certain, the trade secret monopoly is a great deal more limited
126. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970).
127. Id. § 154.
128. Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971); Dekar
Indus., Inc. v. Bissett-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971); Water Servs., Inc. v. Tesco Chems.,
Inc., 410 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969); Winston Research Corp. v. Minne-
sota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965); Servo Corp.
of America v. General Electric Corp., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934 (1966).
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than the patent monopoly, but it is a monopoly, nevertheless. It
should be evaluated for its influence upon free competition.
The courts before Kewanee had ignored this monopoly aspect
of trade secret law because they focused almost entirely upon the
means (e.g., the breach of the confidential relationship) by which
the information was obtained and failed to really consider the
subject matter of the trade secret (e.g., the possibility that the
information may be subject to patent laws, so that in fact the
inventor is attempting to substitute a trade secret monopoly for a
patent monopoly).
On the other hand, Kewanee focused on the subject matter of
the trade secret, but did not consider the means by which it was
obtained. The Kewanee court refused to impose liability upon
former employees who misappropriated trade secrets, holding that
federal patent law preempted state trade secret law. The court
thereby failed to consider the possible effect of its decision upon the
obtaining of protection for the inventor so that he can reap the
benefits of his invention. As the discussion of Kewanee in Sec-
tion V pointed out, business relationships will be seriously dis-
rupted if state trade secret law is determined to be preempted
completely by federal patent law as to objects which could be
subject to patent laws.
This comment has attempted to analyze and criticize the de-
cisions which have focused almost exclusively upon either the
means by which the trade secret was obtained or the subject
matter of the trade secret. Merely depending upon one ele-
ment without considering the other has meant that either the po-
tential trade secret monopoly or the possible negative effect upon
the incentive to invent has not been adequately treated. This
comment has argued that both the means by which the trade
secret was obtained and the subject matter of the trade secret
should be considered in deciding whether liability for the breach
of a trade secret should be imposed. By articulating both ele-
ments and the underlying policy goals, it is hoped that some sort
of a balance can be struck. Steps toward such a balancing test
can be implied from decisions written by Judge Wisdom 129 and
Judge Friendly.130
Although Goldstein dealt with copyright law and so is not
directly applicable, a few theories might be developed from this
related area to assist in predicting how the Court might hold in
its expected upcoming decision on Kewanee.
129. See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
130. See note 101 and accompanying text supra.
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In Goldstein, the majority appeared uneasy with the continua-
tion of the trend toward federal preemption, and was willing to
allow the states to protect recordings which Congress was not
willing to protect. The majority spoke broadly of the lack of nec-
essity of federal preemption. Certainly, the same logic could
be applied easily to the Kewanee facts as well. State trade secret
law clearly has been developed to include both items which are
patentable and those which are not. To decree that trade secret
law no longer existed would create a considerable furor, as a con-
siderable number of business relationships are dependent upon
trade secret law.
Perhaps as important was the line of reasoning suggested by
the strong dissent in Goldstein, which complained that the inequi-
ties implicit in the unsavory business of tape pirating should not
be allowed to influence the Court's judgment. Whether this prob-
lem of equity was raised in the chambers when Goldstein was de-
cided and whether it will be discussed in Kewanee is, of course,
a matter of speculation. If the issue is raised as a key factor to
be considered, however, it is likely that Kewanee will be reversed.
The concept of providing judicial sanction for disloyal employees
who misappropriate their former employers' expertise, which
had been developed over a period of years, for their own short-
term gain would seem to be more unsavory than the copying of
another's records. As the various appellate courts before Kewanee
stated, there is a confidential relationship involved in many trade
secret actions which should be preserved. Such a confidential re-
lationship also existed in Kewanee.
What this comment has advocated is that the Supreme Court
should not reverse Kewanee simply on the grounds that a confi-
dential relationship was involved, but rather should open the
doors to the principle that both the means by which the trade
secret was obtained and the subject matter of that trade secret
should be analyzed to determine the possible impact upon the free
competition of ideas and the protection of an inventor's ideas.
Henry Wright '75
